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In ‘Sidgwick’s Epistemology’, John Deigh argues that Henry Sidgwick’s The Methods of
Ethics ‘was not perceived during his lifetime as a major and lasting contribution to British
moral philosophy’ and that interest in it declined considerably after Sidgwick’s death
because the epistemology on which it relied ‘increasingly became suspect in analytic
philosophy and eventually [it was] discarded as obsolete’. In this article I dispute these
claims.
In a recent article in this journal, John Deigh1 argues that Henry
Sidgwick’sTheMethods of Ethics2 ‘was not perceived during his lifetime
as a major and lasting contribution to British moral philosophy’ (438),
and that interest in it declined considerably after Sidgwick’s death
because the epistemology on which it relied ‘increasingly became
suspect in analytic philosophy and eventually [it was] discarded as
obsolete’ (439). In this article I dispute these claims.
I
Deigh argues that Sidgwick’s Methods ‘was not perceived during his
lifetime as a major and lasting contribution to British moral philosophy’
(438). However, this is far from clear. First, to make his point Deigh
relies on an article in Encyclopaedia Britannica and an obituary in
Mind by Leslie Stephen.3 These are not decisive. Stephen announces at
the outset of his obituary that he is not concerned to provide an estimate
of Sidgwick’s work in philosophy, though he notes that Methods is a
‘great book’ and that Sidgwick’s work in ethics gave ‘the most important
of all modern contributions towards a clear realisation of the conditions
of approaching the problems involved’.4 The encyclopaedia article does
not deny that Methods is a major contribution; instead, it merely fails
to single it out.5 Second, a number of important philosophers were
sent copies of Methods when the first edition was published in 1874,
1 John Deigh, ‘Sidgwick’s Epistemology’, Utilitas 19 (2007), pp. 435–46. All bare
parenthetical references in the text are to this work.
2 Henry Sidgwick, The Methods of Ethics, 7th edn. (London, 1907). Hereinafter ME.
3 Encyclopaedia Britannica, 9th–10th edns. (London, 1903), vol. 32, p. 618 and Leslie
Stephen, ‘Henry Sidgwick’, Mind 10 (1901), pp. 1–17.
4 Stephen, ‘Henry’, pp. 7 and 15.
5 I owe the point in this sentence to Robert Shaver.
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including John Caird, J. E. Carines, Alexander Bain and T. R. Birks. All
praised the book. In a letter thanking Sidgwick for a copy of Methods,
Bain claimed that ‘no work in Ethics ever impressed me so much’ and
that what will make the work ‘live’ is the ‘triumphant way that Utility
is erected in the basis of Common Sense’.6 Although he had not read
Methods in its entirety, when Cairnes wrote to thank Sidgwick for his
copy he claimed that the writing was a ‘rare treat’.7
Third, the praise continued in various reviews. Henry Calderwood
declared that despite his misgivings about Sidgwick’s account of
intuitionism the latter had ‘rendered a great service to Intuitionalism
by the line of criticism he has followed in treating of the several virtues’
and that he admired ‘the ability manifest everywhere throughout the
book’.8 Alexander Bain maintained that it is ‘one of the best volumes of
the present generation’ and that it is a ‘great work’.9 To an article
on Methods by Alfred Barratt in Mind the editor attached a note
stating that the interest that ‘continues to be excited by The Methods
of Ethics . . . is a notable fact in English philosophy at the present day,
and there should remain due record of it in the pages of this Journal’.10
In his critical notice of the third edition of Methods, Hastings Rashdall
claimed that the work ‘has long been recognised as a philosophical
classic’ and that
It is one of those books of which it is safe to prophesy that no advance in
philosophic doctrine will ever render them obsolete. It is not merely a piece
of acute and subtle philosophical criticism but a work of art with a unity and
beauty of its own as much as a Dialogue of Plato or of Berkeley.11
In his review of the fourth edition of Methods, G. von Gizycki writes
that ‘few books deserve to the same degree as this to be recommended
to students of ethics; for few to a like degree constrain us to clear and
exact thinking’.12
Fourth, during Sidgwick’s lifetime a number of important moral
philosophers took pains to come to grips with Methods. T. H. Green
devoted considerable attention to Sidgwick’s views in Prolegomena to
Ethics.13 F. H. Bradley devoted both a small part of Ethical Studies
6 Sidgwick Papers, Wren Library, Trinity College, Cambridge University,
Add.Ms.c.93.22.
7 Sidgwick Papers, Wren Library, Trinity College, Cambridge University,
Add.Ms.c.93.71.
8 Henry Calderwood, ‘Mr. Sidgwick on Intuitionalism’, Mind 1 (1876), p. 206.
9 Alexander Bain, ‘Mr. Sidgwick’s Methods of Ethics’, Mind 1 (1876), pp. 185 and
195.
10 Alfred Barrett, ‘The “Suppression” of Egoism’, Mind 2 (1877), p. 167n.
11 Hastings Rashdall, ‘Professor Sidgwick’s Utilitarianism’, Mind 10 (1885), p. 200.
12 G. von Gizycki, Review of The Methods of Ethics, 4th edn., International Journal of
Ethics 1 (1890), p. 120.
13 T. H. Green, Prolegomena to Ethics, ed. David Brink (Oxford, 2003). See especially
§§ 364–82.
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and a whole pamphlet,Mr. Sidgwick’s Hedonism, toMethods.14 Herbert
Spencer dealt at length in The Data of Ethics with some of Sidgwick’s
views.15 F. Y. Edgeworth did the same in New and Old Methods of
Ethics, and in his Mathematical Psychics: An Essay on the Application
of Mathematics to the Moral Sciences he writes that Methods is a ‘great
work’ in which ‘the distinction between egoism and utilitarianism has
been drawn with matchless skill by Mr. Sidgwick’, and that his aim in
part is to ‘confirm Mr. Sidgwick’s proof that Greatest Happiness is the
end of right action’.16
II
Deigh claims that ‘attention to and interest in the ideas and arguments
in Methods greatly diminished after Sidgwick’s death’ (438). This is,
however, hard to accept. In 1901, F. H. Hayward opined that
If thoughts and suggestions can be regarded for the moment as entities capable
of enumeration, theMethods of Ethics probably contains a greater number than
any other ethical work of the size that has ever been written. It is a rich mine of
thought from which moralists will borrow (with or without acknowledgement)
for years to come.17
He was right. G. E. Moore cited Sidgwick more than any
other philosopher in Principia Ethica.18 Moore went so far as
to claim that ‘only one ethical writer’, i.e. Sidgwick, avoided
committing the naturalistic fallacy.19 In Ethics, he reproduced
(without acknowledgement) Sidgwick’s arguments against definitional
or analytical naturalism.20 J. M. E. McTaggart wrote the now
underappreciated and little read ‘The Ethics of Henry Sidgwick’.21
Hastings Rashdall devoted considerable attention to Sidgwick’s view
in his The Theory of Good and Evil.22 He was particularly impressed
14 F. H. Bradley, Ethical Studies (Oxford, 1876) and Mr. Sidgwick’s Hedonism (London,
1877).
15 Herbert Spencer, The Data of Ethics (London, 1879).
16 F. Y. Edgeworth, New and Old Methods of Ethics (Oxford, 1877) and Mathematical
Psychics: An Essay on the Application of Mathematics to the Moral Sciences (London,
1881), pp. 104, 102 and vii (italics in original).
17 F. H. Hayward, The Ethical Philosophy of Sidgwick: Nine Essays, Critical and
Expository (London, 1901), p. 15.
18 G. E. Moore, Principia Ethica (Cambridge, 1903).
19 Moore, Principia, p. 17; see also p. 59. The truth of Moore’s statement will not concern
me here.
20 See G. E. Moore, Ethics (London, 1912), chs. 2–3. W. D. Ross (with acknowledgement)
and A. J. Ayer (without acknowledgement) do the same. See W. D. Ross, The Right and
The Good (Oxford, 1930), pp. 7–8 and A. J. Ayer, Language, Truth and Logic (London,
1936), ch. 6. For Sidgwick’s arguments, see ME, pp. 26–35.
21 J. M. E. McTaggart, ‘The Ethics of Henry Sidgwick’, Quarterly Review 205 (1906),
pp. 398–419.
22 Hastings Rashdall, The Theory of Good and Evil, 2 vols. (Oxford, 1907). See also
Hastings Rashdall, Ethics (London, 1913), where much attention is paid to Sidgwick,
On Sidgwick’s Demise: A Reply to Professor Deigh 73
by Sidgwick’s discussion and evaluation of common-sense morality.
‘The loose statements of Intuitionists as to the clearness, certainty,
adequacy, and self-evidence of the ordinarily received rules of conduct
have never been subjected to so searching, so exhaustive, and so
illuminating an examination.’23 In 1908, in a paper comparing aspects
of Green and Sidgwick, G. F. Barbour described both Green and
Sidgwick as ‘rival leaders of English ethical thought’.24 H. A. Prichard
began writing about him in the 1920s, though in work that was not at
the time published.25 In 1928, E. F. Carritt described ME as ‘The best
exposition of the rationalist or altruistic utilitarian theory.’26 In 1934,
W. D. Lamont maintained that ‘Any criticism of Utilitarianism would
be more incomplete than need be, if it neglected to take account of the
development of the principles of that school by Professor Sidgwick.’27
Lamont chastises C. D. Broad for the derogatory statements he makes
about Sidgwick in comparing him to Green: ‘No worthy follower
of Green would so under-rate Sidgwick’s influence’.28 He adds that
Sidgwick has ‘many distinguished disciples, past and present’.29 He
goes on to discuss the quality that gives Sidgwick’s work a ‘permanent
disciplinary value for students of philosophy’; he does not impugn
Broad’s positive claims about Sidgwick.30 In 1939, Ross suggested that
he is the ‘clearest-headed of the hedonists’.31 In the same work Ross
cites Sidgwick nearly as many times as he cites Aristotle, Kant, Broad
and Moore.32 So, pace Deigh, Broad was not the only Englishman who
admired Sidgwick’s work (439).33
and Is Conscience an Emotion? (Boston, 1914), in which Rashdall expresses agreement
with many of Sidgwick’s doctrines; see pp. 42, 113–14, 128, 130 and 183.
23 Rashdall, Theory, vol. 1, p. 83.
24 G. F. Barbour, ‘Green and Sidgwick on the Community of the Good’,The Philosophical
Review 17 (1908), p. 149.
25 See H. A. Prichard, ‘Manuscript on Morals’, Moral Writings, ed. Jim MacAdam
(Oxford, 2002), pp. 114–62.
26 E. F. Carritt, The Theory of Morals: An Introduction to Ethical Philosophy (Oxford,
1928), p. 143.
27 W. D. Lamont, Introduction to Green’s Moral Philosophy (London, 1934), p. 172.
28 Lamont, Green’s, p. 21. Lamont is referring to Broad’s suggestion that Green
‘probably made far more undergraduates into prigs than Sidgwick will ever make into
philosophers’. See C. D. Broad, Five Types of Ethical Theory (London, 1930), p. 144.
29 Lamont, Green’s, p. 21.
30 Lamont, Green’s, p. 21.
31 W. D. Ross, The Foundations of Ethics (Oxford, 1939), p. 27.
32 A decade and a half later, Ross remarks on the ‘careful criticism by Sidgwick’ of
‘Kant’s use of the term “freedom”’. See W. D. Ross, Kant’s Ethical Theory (Oxford, 1954),
pp. 83–4.
33 See also F. H. Hayward, ‘The True Significance of Sidgwick’s “Ethics” ’, International
Journal of Ethics 11 (1901), pp. 175–87; E. E. Constance Jones, ‘Mr. Hayward’s Evaluation
of Professor Sidgwick’s Ethics’, International Journal of Ethics 11 (1901), pp. 354–60; F.
H. Hayward, ‘A Reply’, International Journal of Ethics 11 (1901), pp. 360–65; James Seth,
‘The Ethical System of Henry Sidgwick’, Mind 10 (1901), pp. 172–87; Ernest Albee, ‘An
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Finally, it is dubious to claim that the decline of the epistemology
that Sidgwick relied on was the reason for Methods’s putative
decline. Deigh maintains that Sidgwick subscribed to philosophical
intuitionism, the view according to which there are (a) abstract
self-evident propositions or intuitions and (b) a set of derivatively
justified propositions justified by argumentative appeal to the non-
derivatively justified or self-evident propositions.34 Deigh argues
that this epistemology, the traditional intuitionist conception of
epistemology, fell into philosophical disrepute following Sidgwick’s
death and with it went interest in Methods (439–43).35 His argument
seems to be as follows. Premiss One: The conception of epistemology to
which Sidgwick subscribed was impugned in the domain in which it was
held to be most plausible, i.e. mathematics, owing to the development
of non-Euclidean geometry and Go¨del’s second incompleteness result.
These developments meant that self-evidence ‘ceased to be a property
that one needs to attribute to some mathematical propositions in
order to explain mathematical knowledge’ (445). Premiss Two: If an
epistemology loses credibility/is impugned in the domain in which it
is thought to be most plausible, then it loses credibility/is impugned
in additional domains in which it is utilized. Conclusion: Therefore,
because defenders of the sort of epistemology to which Sidgwick
appealed could ‘no longer invoke it [Euclidian geometry] to substantiate
their conception of knowledge’ it developed a shady reputation in ethics
and with it went concern about Methods (442).
There are three responses to this argument. First, it is far from
clear that Sidgwick actually holds to all aspects of the traditional
intuitionist conception of knowledge. He does suggest at one point
that he thinks one can deduce the rules of common-sense morality
from his philosophical intuitions (ME 102). He also claims that he
relies on his philosophical intuitions and the intuitionist method to
arrive at utilitarianism (ME 388, 406–7). However, when he outlines
his philosophical intuitions in Book III of ME, he does not in any
Examination of Professor Sidgwick’s Proof of Utilitarianism’, The Philosophical Review
10 (1901), pp. 251–60; Henry Barker, ‘A Recent Criticism of Sidgwick’s Methods of Ethics’,
The Philosophical Review 11 (1902), pp. 607–13; Bernard Bosanquet, ‘Hedonism Among
Idealists (I.)’, Mind 12 (1903), pp. 202–24; E. E. Constance Jones, ‘Professor Sidgwick’s
Ethics’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 4 (1903–4), pp. 32–52; James Seth, A
Study of Ethical Principles, 12th edn. (New York, 1911); W. R. Sorley, ‘Henry Sidgwick’,
International Journal of Ethics 11 (1901), pp. 168–74; and A. C. Pigou, ‘Some Remarks
on Utility’, The Economic Journal 13 (1903), pp. 58–63.
34 For a rival account of Sidgwick’s epistemology, see John Rawls, A Theory of Justice
(Cambridge, Mass., 1971), p. 51 and J. B. Schneewind, Sidgwick’s Ethics and Victorian
Moral Philosophy (Oxford, 1977). For an account of Sidgwick’s epistemology which has
some similarities to Deigh’s view, see my ‘Henry Sidgwick’s Moral Epistemology’, Journal
of the History of Philosophy (forthcoming).
35 Deigh does not, however, cite anyone who dismisses Methods for this reason.
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strict sense deduce common-sense morality or utilitarianism from
them. In fact, he denies that you can (ME 379). This suggests that
Sidgwick does not see the relationship between his intuitions and
various methods of ethics (e.g. utilitarianism) in the way that Deigh’s
account of Sidgwick’s epistemology suggests. In fact, it is quite difficult
to ascertain how Sidgwick’s philosophical intuitions figure into the
argument for utilitarianism. At best they form part of the argument for
the view, which includes a negative argument against common-sense
morality and its philosophical counterpart, dogmatic intuitionism, and
a Millian-style ‘proof’.36
Second, it cannot be correct that the rejection of Sidgwick’s
epistemology contributed to the decline of Methods, for works by E. F.
Carritt, W. D. Ross, Hastings Rashdall, G. E. Moore, H. A. Prichard,
C. D. Broad, among others, subscribed to a similar epistemology, but
did not similarly disappear from philosophical view in that period of
time.37 Deigh suggests that this is due to the fact that these other
thinkers, especially Moore and Ross, ‘could prop up their theories with
metaphysical and psychological theses that were alien to Sidgwick’s
theory’, e.g. that moral properties are non-natural properties and that
we have a special moral faculty for intuiting moral facts (443–4).38 But
this is a poor explanation. How does subscription to these specific views
help defenders of the traditional intuitionist epistemology explain ‘why
one needs to attribute self-evidence to some ethical propositions in
order to explain ethical knowledge’ (445)?39 It is not clear how one
can ward off worries about the dubiety of the traditional intuitionist
conception of epistemology by adopting a specific metaethical or
psychological view, and Deigh does not fully explain how one can do
so.40 If appeal to self-evidence or intuition is sufficient to impugn an
36 For an account of Sidgwick’s philosophical intuitions and the role they play in
his argument for utilitarianism, see my ‘Sidgwick’s Philosophical Intuitions’, Etica &
Politica /Ethics and Politics 10 (2008), pp. 185–209. This paper can be found at
<http://www2.units.it/∼etica/2008_2/SKELTON.pdf>.
37 Whether these philosophers subscribe to all aspects of the traditional intuitionist
conception of knowledge is open to dispute, though this will not concern me here.
38 It is far from clear that the differences between Moore and Ross on the one hand
and Sidgwick on the other are as stark as Deigh suggests. For a different view, see
Thomas Hurka, ‘Moore in the Middle’, Ethics 113 (2003), pp. 599–628. Sidgwick’s denial
that moral claims are descriptive of the natural world may be enough, if Deigh is right,
to help him avoid the problems that Deigh points out for the traditional intuitionist
conception of epistemology.
39 It is noteworthy that Ross and Prichard claim that there are analogies between
mathematical and moral knowledge. See H. A. Prichard, ‘Does Moral Philosophy Rest
on a Mistake?’, Moral Writings, ed. Jim MacAdam (Oxford, 2002), p. 13, and Ross, Good,
pp. 32–3.
40 Deigh discusses the possibility that a Euclidean could insist that her postulates
are self-evident even in light of non-Euclidean alternatives. He rejects this move
as ‘unscientific’, since it would entail that we have a ‘special faculty for directly
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epistemology, then this should be true regardless of the ontology or
psychology to which an individual subscribes. This is confirmed by
recent defences of rational intuitionism in general epistemology, where
the tack is to defend the view in light of the worries that Deigh raises
and only after a full defence of the view raise the issue of the appropriate
ontology to which a rational intuitionist should subscribe.41
Third, one can reject premiss two of Deigh’s argument. One may well
accept that the epistemology did not work out in, e.g., geometry and
related areas but reject that this implies that it does not work well
or plausibly in ethics. Bertrand Russell, one of the individuals whom
Deigh lists as an architect of the putative decline of the traditional
intuitionist conception of knowledge, presumably thought this at one
point.42 In 1955, he declared that there is ‘no logical objection to
this theory [i.e. ethical intuition], and I am not prepared to reject it
decisively’.43 He goes on to note that the view has a ‘grave drawback’,
that there is a lack of consensus regarding what we ought to do. He
does not mention the decline of the view in geometry and other areas
of mathematics. In the same period those friendly to the Sidgwickian
approach to moral epistemology continued to turn out defenses of it.
In his Second Thoughts in Moral Philosophy, the later intuitionist
A. C. Ewing advances a ‘middle way’ in metaethics. He eschews reliance
on non-natural properties and special faculties but not on intuition
or, as he preferred to call it, ‘direct cognition’.44 He argues that by
direct cognition we are able to cognize that ‘certain factual properties
or circumstances constitute a reason why certain attitudes ought to
apprehending the nature of physical space’ and ‘natural science cannot allow appeals
to faculties beyond the senses as sources of evidence of the nature of the physical world’
(443). His view appears to be that appeals to special faculties in ethics are unproblematic
because there is no constraint in ethics on allowing faculties beyond the senses as sources
of evidence of the nature of the moral world.
41 See Laurence Bonjour, In Defense of Pure Reason (Cambridge, 1998). Bonjour is
a Platonist. He does not hold the view that an appeal to Platonist metaphysics helps
him defend the intuitionist epistemology against objections. See Bonjour, p. 158. It
should be noted that in contemporary ethics the tack is to defend the traditional
intuitionist conception of knowledge in part by renouncing special faculties and non-
natural properties. See, for example, Roger Crisp, ‘Sidgwick and the Boundaries of
Intuitionism’, Ethical Intuitionism: Re-evaluations, ed. Philip Stratton-Lake (Oxford,
2002), pp. 56–75, and Robert Audi, The Good in the Right (Princeton, 2004).
42 Deigh maintains that Russell believes that the axioms of logic are known intuitively
(443). Perhaps Russell’s thought is that the problems with the traditional intuitionist
conception of knowledge are confined to mathematics.
43 Bertrand Russell, Human Society in Ethics and Politics (New York, 1955), p. 93;
italics in original. In the same place he notes agreement with some of Sidgwick’s views;
see pp. 96–7 and 99.
44 A. C. Ewing, Second Thoughts in Moral Philosophy (New York, 1959), p. 66. Around
the same time, A. J. Ayer was defending reliance on intuition in both mathematics and
logic; see The Problem of Knowledge (London, 1956). At the very least this weakens
Deigh’s claim about the decline of the traditional intuitionist conception of knowledge.
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be adopted or certain actions done . . . we see immediately that certain
factors constitute a reason’.45 He does not address the worry that Deigh
raises.46 Instead, he addresses what he calls ‘one of the most popular
arguments’ against appeal to direct cognition, which is expressed by
P. F. Strawson, and is not the sort of worry that Deigh discusses.
Perhaps the more likely explanation for the decline of the traditional
intuitionist conception of knowledge in ethics (though not Methods) is
the popularity of Strawson’s attack on it47 and the development of a
plausible rival account of moral epistemology, i.e. Rawlsian coherentist
reflective equilibrium.48
askelto4@uwo.ca
45 Ewing, Second Thoughts, p. 66.
46 Nor is the worry addressed in Oliver A. Johnson’s defence of an intuitionist position
that has much in common with Sidgwick’s view. See Oliver A. Johnson, ‘Ethical
Intuitionism – A Restatement’, The Philosophical Quarterly 7 (1957), pp. 193–203. In his
defence Johnson appeals to neither special moral faculties nor non-natural properties.
47 P. F. Strawson, ‘Ethical Intuitionism’, Philosophy 24 (1949), pp. 23–33.
48 I wish to thank Bart Schultz and, especially, Robert Shaver for helpful comments
on an earlier draft, the librarians at the Wren Library, Trinity College, Cambridge
University and at the Thomas Fisher Rare Book Library, University of Toronto for
research assistance, and the University of Western Ontario’s Academic Development
Fund and International Research Award programmes for generous research support.
